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IH THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
LOCALS No. 222 and 976, for and 
on behalf of membership, 
Petitioners and Appellants 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, ITS 
BOARD OF REVIEW, APPEALS 
REFEREE AND CLAIMS SUPER-
VISOR, INTERMOUNTAIN OPER-
ATORS LEAGUE, ORANGE 
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY 
and INLAND FREIGHT LINES, 
Respondents and Appellees. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
8428 
The Petitioners and Appellants, Local Unions 
No. 222 and 976, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs and Helpers of America, are here 
representing their various members who have been 
denied uNemployment compensation benefits under 
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Section 35-4-5 (d), Utah Code Anrtotated, 1953. 
The claimants claim benefits from the 19th day of 
May, 1955 until the 11th day of June, 1955. During 
that period a strike was in progress at Pacific Inter-
mountain Express Company and Consolidated 
Freightways, Inc., but the employees of those com-
panies are not claimants herein. Strikes were in 
progress from the 12th day of June until about the 
19th day of June, 1955, against Orange Transporta-
tion Company, Inland Freight Lines and Milne 
Freight Lines, during which time no benefits are 
claimed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the hearing before the Appeals Examiner it 
was stipulated that the Intermountain Operators 
League was composed of trucking companies operat-
ing in Utah and Idaho, and that Arrowhead Freight-
lines, Interstate Motor Lines, Utah-Arizona Freight 
Lines, Garrett Freight Lines, Inc., Gallagher Freight 
Lines, Consolidated Freightways, Inc., Ringsby Truck 
Lines, Co., Pacific Intermountain Express Co., Inland 
Freight Lines and Orange Transportation Company 
had in the past bargained through the Intermountain 
Operators League. It was agreed that the Inter-
mountain Operators League and four local unions in 
Utah and Idaho have been parties to collective bar-
gaining agreements covering operations in Utah and 
Idaho, and that thf' 1952-10:3:3 Master Labor Agree-
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ment was completely terminated by both the Unions 
and the League (R 50, 62). Following the termina-
tion of this contract there was no contractual obliga-
tion on the part of the union to have their members 
report to work for any employer, and also no obliga-
tion on the part of the employer to provide work for 
any employee. 
The Intermountain Operators League is a volun-
tary association of Employers who have joined to-
gether for the purposes of bargaining within the 
states of Utah and Idaho. (R 62) The Orange Trans-
portation Company withdrew from the Intermoun-
tain Operators League by a letter addressed to the 
Unions on February 24, 19S5, (Appellants Exhibit 
No. 1), which reads: 
"On behalf of Orange Transportation 
Company, Inc. notice is hereby given that 
they are no longer a part of the bargaining 
unit which has heretofore entered into the 
agreement between the Intermountain Opera-
tors League and yourself. 
"Orange Transportation Company, Inc. 
desires to bargain as an individual and will 
meet at any time that is convenient to the 
parties involved." 
Following this letter, the Orange Transportation 
Company, Inc. did not participate in the bargaining 
sessions between the unions and the Intermountain 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Operators League (R 42, 65, 66). An officer of the 
Company, however, did attend some of the meetings 
strictly as an observer ·cR 43), but refused to acknow-
ledge their presence at such meeting. The Inter-
mountain Operators League was not authorized to nor 
could it bind Orange Transportation Company, Inc., 
Inland Freight Lines or Milne Freight Lines to any 
collective bargaining agreement, as they announced 
that they would not sign the agreement reached on 
the Coast, and a separate strike was called against 
those companies CR 47). Individual bargaining was 
carried on with Orange Transportation Company, 
Inland Freight Lines and Milne Freight Lines until a 
new contract was agreed to by the parties. (R 47). 
The Unions and Employers held negotiation 
meetings in Salt Lake City prior to May 1, 1955, seek-
ing to agree upon a new contract. The Union de-
mands were submitted to the Employers and the 
counter proposals submitted through the League CR 
24, 26). After the first week in May, 1955~ there 
were no further meetings between the unions and 
the Intermountain Operators League (R ++~ 64, 65). 
Meetings were held in Los Angeles between Unions 
and Employers of the eleven western states, and 
P. I. E. and Consolidated Freightways operate in 
most of the vVestern States. CR +4~ 6+, 65). 
All ten of the Employers of the Intermountain 
Operators League posted cargo embargos at Chicago 
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and other Eastern points on the 27th and 28th of 
April, 1955, and at West Coast points on the 28th of 
April, 1955, advising their customers that they would 
not accept any more business CR 45, 49, 68). These 
same employers also on the Saturday prior to May 
1st, 1955, posted notices advising their employees 
that there would be no further work until they were 
notified. CR 45) Mr. Callister stated that the reason 
for these notices \Yas that the Employers did not know 
whether they could operate after the first day of 
May as their contract had been terminated CR 68). 
The Unions had on many occasions promised and 
guaranteed that the Employers would have sufficient 
notice of any strike that they could plan their opera-
tions and would guarantee delivery of any freight 
on their docks or in transit. ( R 48, 64, 68) . 
The Employers submitted several proposals, 
among which was a proposal to eleminate the pro-
cedure of changing division points (Employers Ex-
hibit A, R 26). Such proposals were discussed at the 
Salt Lake meetings, with Pacific Intermountain Ex-
press and Consolidated Freightways taking the lead 
in such demands for change in terminal points ( R 
44) . The meetings were then moved to Los Angeles 
and P. I. E. and Consolidated made new demands 
for terminal changes to be effective over their entire 
operations in the 11 vVestern States. CR ~t5). The 
demands and issue of the terminal change made by 
P. I. E. and Consolidated at the Los Angeles MPetings 
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was the sole issue that the strike was called against 
them (R 44, 52). The other Employers of the 
Intermountain Operators League did not take a firm 
stand or position on the terminal change issue either 
at Salt Lake or in the Los Angeles Meetings (R 52). 
The terminal issue was the sole issue for the strike 
against P. I. E. and Consolidated on the 19th of May, 
1955. (R 44, 45 52). 
The Intermountain Operators League first an-
nounced "a strike against one will be considered a 
strike against all" on the night before the pickets were 
established at P. I. E. and Consolidated, and after the 
strike .had ben decided upon (R 46, 61). This was 
the only announcement of such a policy to be taken 
by the League and was made even though there had 
been no meetings between the parties since the 1st 
week of May, and the strike issues were determined 
in Los Angeles and over· the 11 Western States (R 
46) . The spokesman for the union informed the 
League that all employees were ready, willing and 
ready to work for all Employers except P. I. E. and 
Consolidated (R 46). The League was also informed 
that all other Companies could operate and the unions 
would give them sufficient notice if they \Yere struck 
so that all freight could be delivered (R 65). 
The Employer members of the Intermountain 
Operators League posted a second cargo boycott at 
Eastern and Western customer ter~inal points as 
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soon as they learned of the strike at P. I. E. and 
Consolidated (R 48, 49). At the same time notices 
were posted by the employers that their employees 
were not to report for work until called, but all did 
not completely close down their operations (R 48, 
54). There was sufficient freight and business avail-
able for the employers to operate if they had accepted 
it CR 49). 
At no time did any employee fail to report for 
work, but on the contrary were at all times, ready, 
willing and presented themselves for work (R 48). 
Some employees were retained by their employers 
nearly all of the period from May 19th to June 12th 
to move regular freight of the employer (R 48, 55). 
There was never any strike, work stoppage, slow 
down or refusal to work on the part of the employees 
of any employer other than P. I. E. and Consolidated 
during the time in question ( R 45) . 
There is no past history of the Employers taking 
the position that a strike against one is a strike 
against all, as in the past when one employer was 
shut down the remainder operated ( R 7 4) . 
A memorandum agreement was reached in nego-
tiations between Employers and the unions of the 
11 Western states at Los Angeles, and several member 
of the Intermountain Operators League declined to 
accept the terms of this agreement. ( R 47, 65). The 
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union was advised that the League did not represent 
these employers and could not bargain for them 
( R 65) . A picket line and strike was called against 
Orange Transportation Company, Inc., Inland Freight 
Lines and Milne Freight Lines on the 12th day of 
June and lasted about a week (R 47). No new agree-
ment has been signed between the parties but have 
orally agreed to accept the memorandum agreement 
terms as reached in Los Angeles (R 47). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT ONE 
THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND DECISION OF 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARE NOT SUPPORTED 
BY EVIDENCE. 
POINT TWO 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO MAKE 
FINDINGS OF FACTS REQUIRED TO DISQUALIFY 
CLAIMANTS FOR- BENEFITS UNDER AND BY VIRTUE 
OF SECTION 35-4-5 (d) . 
SUBPOINT A 
WAS THE CLAIMANTS UNEMPLOYMENT DUE TO 
A STOPPAGE OF WORK? 
SUBPOINT B 
WAS THERE A STOPPAGE OF \YORK EXISTING 
BECAUSE OF A STRIKE INVOLVING THE GRADE, CLASS 
OR GROUP OF WORKERS OF THE CLAIMANTS HEREIN? 
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SUBPOINT C 
THERE WAS NO STRIKE INVOLVING THE GRADE, 
CLASS OR GROUP OF WORKERS AT THE FACTORY OR 
ESTABLISHMENT WHERE CLAIMANTS ARE OR WERE 
LAST EMPLOYED. 
SUBPOINT D 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN APPLY-




THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND DECISION OF 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARE NOT SUPPORTED 
BY EVIDENCE. 
The Industrial Commission, Department of Em-
ployment Security, of the State of Utah, by a two to 
one vote, adopted as its own, the findings of fact, 
conclusions and decision of the Appeals Referee of 
that department CR 96:98), and it is from these that 
this Petition for Review is taken. 
The finding in paragraph 3 of the Findings of 
Fact CR 79) "that they desired certain changes in 
any operating agreement to be effective after May 
1~ 19-5-5" is unsupported by evidence. The union 
in its notice to the Employer Group CR 23) com-
pletely terminated the 19S2-1 9·3.') Master Labor 
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Agreement. Thereafter both the Union and the Em-
ployers ·considered that the contract had been com-
pletely terminated and there was no agreement in 
existance. 
The finding in Paragraph 5 of the Findings of 
Fact CR 79) "Orange Transportation Company * * * 
subsequently carried on its bargaining with the 
union in conjunction with the other operators" is un-
supported by evidence. Orange Transportation Com-
pany by written letter (Appellants Exhibit No. 1) 
withdrew from the bargaining unit and announced 
that it vvould bargain on an individual basis. The 
Orange Transportation Company representatives at-
tended some of the meetings but only as an observer 
and refused to sign the roll indicating participation. 
No notice was ever given to the union that Orange 
Transportation Company were participating with the 
group. The Union and Orange Transportation Com-
pany Inland Freight Lines, and Milne Freight Lines 
bargained individually to gain a new contract, after 
a strike was called against these Employers when 
they refused to be bound by any agreement accepted 
by the others. The League was never authorized to 
sign and bind Orange to any agreement and the only 
agreement was signed by Orange itself. 
The finding in paragraph 6 of the Findings of 
Fact ( R 79), "but vvhen no agreernent had been 
reached h~' May 1 S, 1955, thE' Union informed the 
10 
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League that they intended to call a strike against 
Pacific Intermountain Express Company and the Con-
solidated Freightways Inc.", is contrary to the evi-
dence. There were no meetings between the unions 
and the Intermountain Operators League following 
the first week in May, 1955. The negotiations were 
then moved to Los Angeles, California, and the 
unions and employers of the eleven Western states 
participated. The evidence is that the only sole 
reason for the strike against Pacific Intermountain 
Express and Consolidated Freightways was those two 
companies insistance on the terminal change. The 
other companies of the Intermountain Operators 
League had a bondoned this position, and the two 
companies above caused the issue to be raised 
throughout their operations in the eleven western 
states, and the strike covered their operations 
throughout those states. There is no evidence that 
the strike against Pacific Intermountain Express and 
Consolidated Freightways cover the eleven western 
states was because of a failure to reach an agreement 
covering Utah and Idaho. 
The finding in Paragraph 8 of the Findings of 
Fact ( R 79) "that due to inability to guarantee deliv-
ery because of the strike and the resulting substantial 
decline in business and due to their announced 
policy, * * *The claimants in this case are the em-
ployees of said employers who became unemployed 
when operations were thus curtailed.", is unsupported 
11 
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by evidence. The Unions in the April meeting 
promised and guaranteed the employers, and each 
of them, that if a strike was called that all freight on 
their docks or in transit could be delivered. The 
Unions throughout continued to make such promise 
to guarantee delivery of freight, and when the strike 
)against P. I. E. and Consolidated was called such 
promise was kept. The Employers on or about the 
27th day of April, 1955, notified their customers in 
the East and on the West Coast that they were de-
clining to receive any freight and were suspending 
operations. A second embargo on the receipt of 
freight was issued about the 19th day of May, 1955, 
and the lack of freight, if any, resulted therefrom. 
The strike against P. I. E. and Consolidated, two of 
the largest competitors, increased the business for 
other employers, and there was sufficient freight 
available had the employers chosen to accept it. 
The announced policy in this finding apparently 
refers to the statement of Mr. Callister made \Yhen he 
informed, on the evening before the strike began, 
that the strike had been called against P. I. E. and 
Consolidated over the eleven vYestern states, a strike 
against one vdll be considered a strike against all. 
This was the first time that such a statement, or 
policy had been made by the League. In past years 
when one had been struck the others had operated. 
The fact that the emplo:yers closed do\Yn their opera-
tions on the 1st day of lVIa}", \Yhen there \Yas no strike, 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
disturbance or threat of strike, shows that the em-
ployers here locked out their employees and that the 
strike was not the cause of it but only an excuse for 
it. The unemployment of these claimants is because 
of the acts of the employers in putting out a embargo 
against business, and voluntarily closing down rather 
than to the lack of business or the effect of the strike. 
The findings in Paragraph 9, Findings of Fact, 
CR 80) are a distortion of the facts and unsupported 
by the evidence. The negotiations in Los Angeles, 
California resulted in an understanding being reached 
between the unions and employers in the eleven 
western states. This memo of understanding was 
accepted by many of the unions and employers, but 
Inland Freight Lines, Orange Transportation Com-
pany, l\!Iilne Freight Lines all refused to accept this 
agreement. The strike against Pacific Intermountain 
Express and Consolidated Freight Lines was settled 
on the 11th of June, by these companies accepting the 
new agreement. A strike was commenced against 
Inland Freight Lines, Orange Transportation Com-
pany and Milne Freight Lines on this on June 12 and 
lasted until about June 19, 195-5, when these em-
ployers agreed to accept this nevv agreement. 
POINT TWO 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO MAKE 
FINDINGS OF FACTS REQUIRED TO DISQUALIFY 
CLAIMANTS FOR BENEFITS UNDER AND BY VIRTUE 
OF SECTION 35-4-5 (d) .. 
13 
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The group of claimants were denied unemploy-
ment compensation due to their being unemployed 
from the 19th day of May, 1953, through the 12th 
day of June, 1955, by virtue of the provisions of Sec-
tion 35-4-5 (d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
The original Employment Security Act of the 
State of Utah was passed in 1935, and the disqualifica-
tion provision then read: 
"An employee shall not be entitled to 
benefits: 
" ( 3) If he has left or lost his employ-
ment due to a trade dispute involving the em-
ployer by whom- he was employed, so long 
as such trade dispute continues ... " 
This statute was patterened after an act sug-
gested and proposed by the Federal Security Board 
and by them adopted from the British National In-
surance Act. Under the British Act, and adopted in 
most of the states, the disqualification is based upon 
his leaving due to a "trade" or "labor dispute" 
at the factory, establishment or other premises.- The 
Utah Act of 1935 used the term '"trade dispute" 
taken directly from the British Act. In England the 
word "labor" carries a political implication \Yhich is 
associated with the Labor Party and thus under the 
terminology of the English trade dispute and labor 
dispute were synonymous. In 1936 the Utah Legisla-
tun' revvrote the section entirely removed the refer-
1+ 
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ance to "trade dispute" and now require that a 
"strike" be present, and did not change to a labor 
dispute definition such as passed in 1933 and is now 
34-1-34, U.C.A., 1953. 
The Amended Act, Section 35-+-S, U.C.A., 1953, 
provides in part: 
"':5. An individual shall be ineligible for 
benefits for purposes of establishing a wait-
ing period: 
"(d) For any week in which it is found 
by the Commission that his unemployment 
is due to a stoppage of work which exists be-
cause of a strike involving his grade, class, or 
group of workers at the factory or establish-
ment at which he is or was last employed." 
In general the various states have adopted two 
general distinct types of disqualification statutes in-
volving labor difficulties. A majority of the states 
adopted the type which Utah passed in 1935, which 
makes the disqualification where the claimant has 
left or lost his employment because of or due to a 
trade or labor dispute involving his employer. The 
second type, which has been adopted in many West-
ern States, disqualified the claimant only where there 
is a finding that the unemployment is due to a stop-
page of work which exists because of a labor dispute, 
strike or lockout at the factory or establishment where 
he is or vvas employed. 
15 
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Of the second type of statute, Arizona demands 
a finding of a "labor dispute" or "lock out," Colorado 
a finding of a "strike," Oklahoma a finding of a 
"Labor Dispute," and Utah of course a finding of a 
"strike." 
The distinction and difference in the require-
ments to be found in these types of statues as well as 
the vast distinction between a "labor dispute" or 
"trade dispute" and "strike" are of the utmost import-
ance in the decision in this matter. 
A study of the language of the provisions of Sec-
tion 35-4-5 (d) and it becomes apparent that the 
Commission must find several facts before the claim-
ant is disqualified, namely, ( 1) that his unemploy-
ment is due to a stoppage of work, (2) that the stop-
page of work must exist because of a strike involving 
his grade, class or group of workers, and ( 3) that 
the strike must involve his grade, class, or group of 
workers at the factory or establishment which he is 
or was last employed. The Industrial Commission 
has failed to make findings of fact as required by the 
a hove section, and the matters \Yill be taken up for 
discussion in the a hove order. 
SUBPOINT A. 
WAS THE CLAIMANTS UNE:\IPLOYMENT DUE TO 
A STOPPAGE OF WORK? 
16 
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There is a split of authorities in the courts of the 
United States as to whether the "stoppage of work" 
referred to means a stoppage by the individual em-
ployee, or to a stoppage of the operation of the busi-
ness of the employer. 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma In Mid-
Contintent Petroleum Corp. v. Board of Review, 141 
Pac. 2d 69, with a disqualification provision like that 
of Utah, said: 
"The reasoning of the foregoing officers 
and writers is not very impressive when ap-
plied to our Act of 1936. Had the legislature 
intended to refer to a shutdown of the plant 
and not to the cessation of vvork by the em-
ployees, the term 'stoppage of operations' 
would have been far more appropriate. It 
seems to us that the word 'work' ordinarily 
refers to or comprehends the activities of the 
workman, not the operation of the factory. 
That portion of the act, supra, which disquali-
fied a workman for benefits 'for any week 
* * * in which his total or partial unemploy-
ment is due to a stoppage of work which exists 
because of a labor dispute at the factory' refers, 
with respect to the workman, to his unem-
ployment and to his stoppage of work. A 
strike in a labor sense is generally defined as 
a stoppage of work by common agreement of 
\Yorkingmen. 15 C. J. S. 1008, Par. 11. That 
was the definition evidently in mind of the 
Legislature; the term 'stoppage of work' was 
considered synonymous with 'strike.' " 
17 
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However, the Supreme Court of Arizona in Sakri-
son v. Pierce 66 Ariz. 162, 185 P2d 528, 173 ALR 480, 
in applying the Arizona disqualification statute which 
is identical to Section 35-4-5 (d) of Utah, except that 
it reads "which exists because of a labor dispute, strike 
or lock-out at the factory," and after quoting the dis-
qualification provisions of Alabama, California and 
Ohio, said: 
"In each of these, the disqualification is 
made to depend not upon the cessation of op-
erations at the employers establishment as is 
true in Arizona, but instead upon 'labor dis-
pute ... in active progress'; 'trade dispute ... 
in active progress'; 'labor dispute continues.' 
There is no added requirement, such as in our 
statute, to the effect that the dispute must be 
of such an intense nature that it results in 
the virtual closing down of the place of busi-
ness before compensation is denied to those un-
employed as a result thereof . 
. "For all the reasons outlined, then the 
appellees in the case at bar are not disqualified 
from receiving benefits under Sec. 56-1005 (d) 
of the Arizona Act. By any reasonable inter-
pretation of this section, and consonant with 
the weight of authority, the fact that they con-
fine their claims to a period after the hotel had 
resumed normal operations saves them from 
the effects of our disqualification clause. 
Should a different policy be desired, the re-
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The fact that a claimant may be unemployed be-
cause of a stoppage of work does not disqualify that 
claimant for benefits under Section 35-4-5 (d). There 
must be present the additional fact that the unem-
ployment be due to a stoppage of work which exists 
because of a strike. This principle was applied by 
this court in Employees of Lion Coal Corp. v. Industri-
al Commission, 100 U 207, 111 P 2d 797, where the 
Employer posted a notice on the 18th day of April that 
the mine would be closed for 30 days. The union 
notified the Employer that the interium agreement 
which they had been operating under would be 
terminated on midnight on the 4th of May, and there 
would be a strike. The mine closed down on the 
date notified, but posted the usual work sign on the 
7th, 8th, 9th and 10th of May, and on the 11th the 
union notified the Company that they could operate, 
and the Company removed the work sign. 
On page 798 of Pac. 2d the Court said: 
"* * * In the Utah Fuel case there was a 
definite relationship between the prior stop-
page of work and the strike. However, in the 
instant case, it could not be found that the 
stoppage of work in April existed because of 
the strike weeks after the mine had been 
closed. 
"The Company makes no claim that it 
was able and ready to provide employment for 
the petitioners on any days other than May 
8th, 9th, 10th and 11th, 1939. The petitioners 
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were given their respective lay off slips on the 
20th of April because the company did not 
have sufficient orders to warrant continued 
operations. When circumstances changed in 
May, the company had sufficient business to 
warrant operations and manifested an inten-
tion to operate and offered employment by 
posting the 'work sign.' Then the stoppage of 
work was no longer due to acts of the company 
but was due to the strike of the petitioners." 
In Gulf Atlantic Warehouse Co. v. Bennett, .... 
............ Ala ................ , 51 So 2d 544, it was held that 
the unemployment was due to the company's appre-
hension of a strike and its notification of its customers 
that there might be a strike at the expiration of the 
present contract, and as a result thereof the customers 
ceased doing business with the employer, that the un-
employment was not due to a labor dispute but due 
to the notice. 
See also Barrett v. Wasson Coal Co., +04 Ill. 11, 
87 NE 2d 769. 
All of the employer members of the Inter-
mountain Operators League sent out notices to their 
customers at Chicago, the mid-\Yest and on the 
West Coast, advising that they would not accept any 
freight following the 1st day of May. This freight 
embargo was posted by the Employers on or about 
the 27th or 2gth of April and not removed until 
after May 1st, 1955. These Employers also posted 
notices at their places of business that they \Yere clos-
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ing down and their employees would be notified 
when to report for work. Again, on or about the 
19th day of May, 1955, all of the Employers posted a 
second embargo on the receipt of freight at the 
Eastern and Western customer points. The em-
ployers again notified their employees not to report 
to work as no work was available until they were 
called. These embargos were effective is shown by 
the testimony of Mr. Dippo, Vice President of Inland 
Freight Lines, who testified that prior to the 19th 
day of May they were running about 100% empty 
and so they just closed down. On the other hand 
there is testimony that there was sufficient freight for 
the employers to continue operations during the 
period involved. 
The only finding by the Commission as to a 
work stoppage is in Paragraph 7, Findings of Fact, 
CR 79) in connection with incomplete but substantial 
vvork stoppage incurred at Pacific Intermountain 
Express and Consolidated Freightways. The finding 
in Paragraph 8, Findings of Fact, CR 79) is that the 
claimants became unemployed when the operations 
of their employers were curtailed because of declin-
ing business and announced policy, and not because 
of a work stoppage effecting these claimants. Hence~ 
the unemployment vvhich existed from the 19th of 
May to the 12th of June, 1955, was due to the lack 
of business and voluntary suspension of operations or 
the part of the employers. 
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SUBPOINT B 
WAS THERE A STOPPAGE OF WORK EXISTING 
BECAUSE OF A STRIKE INVOLVING THE GRADE, CLASS 
OR GROUP OF WORKERS OF THE CLAIMANTS HEREIN? 
The Re-Statement of Torts, Section 797, Com-
ment a., defines a strike thusly: 
"A strike is a concerted refusal by em-
ployees to do any work for their employer or 
to work at a customary rate of speed until the 
object of the strike is attained, that is until the 
employer grants the concession demanded." 
The Supreme Court of Colorado in Sandoval v. 
Industrial Commission, 110 Colo. 108, 130 Pac. 2d 
930, wherein the question of whether or not a strike 
was involved, and the statute in Colorado is identical 
to Section 35-4-5- (d), the Court defined a strike as: 
"A strike possesses at least four ingredients 
other than the suspended employer-employee 
relationship which has been mentioned, name-
ly; ( 1) a demand for some concession, general-
ly for a modification of conditions of labor or 
rates of pay; (2) a refusal to work, with intent 
to bring about compliance with the demand; 
( 3) an intention to return to work ·when com-
pliance is accomplished; and ( 4) an intention 
on the part of the operator to re-employ the 
same men or Inen of similar class \Yhen the 
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The Colorado Court then stated that the term 
labor dispute is much broader than is the term strike, 
and that there could be a labor dispute without a 
strike but not vise-versa. 
In Baker v. Powhatan Mining Company, 146 
Ohio State 600, 6 7 NE 2d 714, held that collective 
and concerted discontinuance of work by employees 
for the purpose of obtaining better terms and improv-
ing conditions constitute a strike. In Bankston Creek 
Coaleries v. Gordon, 399 Ill. 291, 71 NE 2d 670 held 
that a strike involves a labor dispute but a labor dis-
pute can exist without a strike. 
In Iron Molders' Union No. 125 v. Allis-Chal-
mers Co., ( CCA 7), 166 Fed 45, the Circuit Court 
defined a strike and lockout as: 
"A strike is a cessation of work by em-
ployees in effort to get for the employees more 
desirable terms. A lockout is a cessation of 
the furnishing of work to employees in an 
effort to get for the employer more desirable 
terms." 
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Baldwin's Century 
Edition, page 1140, defines a strike as: 
"A combined effort by workmen to obtain 
higher wages or other concessions for their 
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The term "lockout' is defined in Restatement 
of Torts Section 787, comment a, as follows: 
"A. A lockout is an employer's with-
holding of work from his employees in order 
to gain a concession from them. It is the 
employer's counterpart of a strike." 
W ebsters New International Dictionary, Second 
Edition, defines lockout: 
"Lockout: To \Vithold employment from 
(a body of employees) as means of bringing 
them to accept the employers terms." 
In Atchinson T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gee, 140 Fed. 
+5, 53, as: 
"An employer's discharge of employees 
about to enter upon a strike, done before they 
can strike, is commonly called a 'lockout.' " 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota in Bucko v. 
J. F. Quest Foundry, 229 Minn. 131, said concerning 
"strike" and "lockout," in a case where a strike "'as 
called against three of a group of employers \Yho had 
bargained together: 
"It can hardly be said that respondent aiH1 
the others similarly situated \YC'n-. out of \Ye:·k 
, due to a strike aga{nst the three establishments 
in which they \YC'n" not employed. The terrn 
'strike' cannot be extended to encompass those 
nine employers \vhose employees \Yere \villing 
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to continue working under the terms of the 
former contract." 
And later said: 
" * * * The fact that a strike was called 
against three did not compel the other nine to 
close their shops. They did so in order to make 
use of an economic weapon which they held 
in their hands and for the sole purpose of 
forcing the union to accept terms less favorable 
than those which the union demanded. The 
evidence is conclusive that at the time the nine 
establishments closed their doors, the em-
ployers of those nine were willing to continue 
to work at the existing rates of pay and accord-
ing to the terms of the pre-existing contract. 
As such it cannot be said that the unemploy-
ment was due to a strike." (Emphasis added) 
There was a strike, under the definitions above, 
against Pacific Intermountain Express and Consoli-
dated Freightways from the 19th day of May until 
the 12th day of June, 1955. Also there was a strike 
against Orange Transportation Company, Inland 
Freight Lines and Milne Freight Lines, from the 12th 
day of June until about the 19th day of June, 1955. 
The strike against Pacific Intermountain Express and 
Consolidated Freightways covered their entire opera-
tions in most of the eleven Western States. The 
evidence is conclusive that all of the claimants here-
in were ready willing and able and presented them-
selves to work for their employers at all of the times 
herein involved, and that there was no refusal, or 
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voluntary unemployment on the part of these em-
ployees. 
There is no dispute that the Employers posted 
notices, one prior to the 1st of May, and one on or 
about the 19th of May, advising their employees 
that they would not work until notified. Also there 
is no dispute that the closing down of the Employers 
herein was a lockout of the claimants, for Mr. 
Callister, testified CR 64): 
"A. Yes-to hit one just the same as they 
hit anyone but under the lavv they are not re-
quired to, of course strike everbody at the same 
time and the only defense we have, of course, 
if that they hit one they hit us all. In other 
words, a strike against P. I. E. was a strike 
against us for the reason that assuming that 
we continued to operate and if P.I.E. made a 
settlement, that settlement would be what ,,~e 
would take." (emphasis added) 
The stoppage of \-Vork which cause the unem-
ployment of the claimants herein was not due to a 
strike, but to the planned, arbitrary, unilateral plan 
of the Employers to lockout their employers. The 
obvious evidence of such pre-conceived plan vvas the 
lockout of their employees on the Saturday prior to 
May 1st, 195·3. The strike against P.I.F. and Con-
solidated did not force the other Employers to cease 
operation, for the evidence is that there \vas ample 
freight for then1 to operate, and some Trucking Com-
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panies did operate during the time. In other words, 
the Employers were in direct competition with the 
struck companies for freight and the strike against 
P.I.E. and Consolidated would have greatly increased 
the amount of business for the remaining carriers, 
and enhanced their operations. 
The Commission did not find that there was a 
strike which caused a work stoppage which caused 
the unemployment of these claimants. Nor did the 
Commission find that there was a strike involving 
workers of the grade, class or group of the claimant. 
We submit that under the definitions of "strike" 
herein that the only strike was against Pacific Inter-
mountain Express and Consolidated Freightways, and 
that the action of the other Employers here was a 
'·lockout" plain and simple, for which the Legislature 
of the State of Utah did not disqualify claimants re-
gardless of the cause of the "lockout." 
SUBPOINT C 
THERE WAS NO STRIKE INVOLVING THE GRADE, 
CLASS OR GROUP OF WORKERS AT THE FACTORY OR 
ESTABLISHMENT WHERE CLAIMANTS ARE OR WERE 
LAST EMPLOYED. 
We submit that the only strike during the time 
herein involved was against Pacific Intermountain 
Express and Consolidated Freightways. There was 
no strike by or envolving any grade, class or group of 
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workers of the eight other trucking companies, and 
these claimants were not employed, hired, paid, 
supervised, carried on the payroll, or had any rela-
tionship whatever with the two struck companies. 
The employers of these claimants closed down their 
operations about the 19th day of May, and these 
workers had been and were hired, employed, paid, 
supervised, carried on the payroll and they performed 
services only for their individual employer and no 
others. 
Generally the various states in their employment 
security statutes requires that the strike, labor dis-
pute, trade dispute, or lockout be in progress at the 
establishment, factory or other premises ,,·here the 
claimant is or was last employed. The interpreta-
tion of these terms have come before the courts several 
times, but not with complete uniformity. However, 
once again; the statutes upon which these decisions 
are based must be scrutini?:ed to determine if they 
require a strike at the factory or establishment where 
claimant is or was last employed, and not the general 
terms of a trade or labor dispute at the factory, 
f'"tablishment or other premises where last employed. 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota in Nordling 
v. Ford Motor Co., +2 N,Y. 2.d 5 76, said: 
"It is true that our act contemplates 
compensation for those "·ho are unemployed 
because of no fault of their O\Yn. flo\Yever~ 
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where there is an express proVIsion for dis-
qualification, the facts must come within the 
meaning of the words used by the majority if 
the disqualification is to be effective. The 
disqualification which we have under consider-
ation related to unemployment due to a labor 
dispute, and it is clear that before such labor 
dispute can effectively disqualify it must be in 
progress at the establishment at which the 
claimant is or was employed. The mere fact 
that the employees are represented by the same 
agent will not suffice to disqualify if the strike 
or labor dispute causing the unemployment is 
not in progress at the establishment at which 
the claimant was, or is, employed." (emphasis 
added). 
And later said: 
"We believe that the solution of the prob-
lem lies in determining from all the facts 
available whether the unit under consideration 
is a separate establishment from the stand-
point of employment, and not whether it is 
a single enterprise from the standpoint of man-
agement or for the more effecient production 
of goods." 
In most of the cases decided upon the specific 
point the employer has been one which has had 
several plants in operation in the production of an 
integrated product. As in the above case, the Ford 
Motor Company, and in General Motors v. Mulquinn, 
134 Conn. 118, 55 A 2d 732, two plants in the produc-
tion of a single product, and the closing of one be-
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cause of a labor dis.pute forces the other to close be-
cause of lack of materials. The Supreme Court of 
Conn., said: 
"* * * Geographical separation is import-
ant but is by no means controlling. Where, 
as here, a manufacturing corporation carries 
on its business in buildings at different locali-
ties, the test is whether they are so operated as 
to constitute a single unit; if so, they amount 
to a single factory. The application of this test 
requires a consideration of many factors, such 
as the scheme of management, supervision, 
and the production of each plant; that is, 
whether or not those locally in immediate 
charge, let us say, of the one plant, are sub-
ject to the authority of those operating the 
other, as distinguished from their being under 
the control of policy-framing officials ranking 
higher in the pyramid of the corporate struc-
ture." 
The Supreme Court of Arizona, held in Mountain 
.States Tele. and Tele. v. Sakrison, 71 Ariz. 219 225 
Pac. 2d 707, that 39 · exchanges of the telephone 
company in Arizona were one single establishment~ 
on the bases of interdependency and operational con-
trol. 
See also: Neidliner v. Unemployment Comp. B 
of R., 710 Pa. Super. 166, 84 A 2d 363; Spielmann v. 
Ind. Comm., 236 \V"isc. 2+0, 295 NW1; Ford Motor 
Co. v. Unemployment Co1npensation Com. 191 Ya. 
812, 63 SE 2d 28; and Matson Terminals v. Calif. 
Emp. Comm. 24 Cal. 2d 695, 151 P. 2d 202. 
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\Ve believe the Supre1ne Court of Minnesota, in 
Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., supra, expressed the 
intention of the Utah legislature when it said: 
"The only substantial change in the 
language of our original act from the British 
act was that the word 'establishment' was sub-
stituted for 'workshop.' It is difficult to be-
lieve that this change was intended to broaden 
the scope of the employment area so as to en-
compass a whole industry rather than a single 
unit of employment." 
We have been unable to find a single case where 
the precise question is, do ten distinct, competing, 
independently owned and operated employers in the 
same industry who bargain jointly constitute a 
"factory" or "establishment" within the meaning of 
the Employment Security Acts. We do not believe 
that such a case will be found, and certainly such 
was not the intention of the legislature of Utah when 
such act was passed. 
If claimant A is hired by, works for, is paid by, 
carried on the payroll, supervised by and has all of 
his job dealings with Garrett Freight Lines, certainly 
all would agree that he is employed by or was last 
employed by Garrett Freight Lines within the mean-
ing of Section 35-4-5 (d) supra. A strike at Pacific 
Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freight-
ways would involve the employees of those companies 
as they are or were last employed by o11e of these 
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companies. There is no evidence that the Inter-
mountain Operators League is an employer, or that it 
bore any relationship of employee and employer to 
any of these claimants, and certainly Pacific Inter-
mountain Express does not and did not bear any re-
lationship of employer-employee to claimant A who 
worked for Garrett Freight Lines. VVe submit that 
there is no evidence upon which to base a finding 
that the strike involved claimants grade, class or 
group of workers at the factory or establishment at 
which he is or was last employed. In addition the 
only evidence as to the reason for the strike called 
against Pacific Intermountain Express and Con-
solidated Freightways was over the sole issue of the 
change of terminals they insisted on over eleven 
Western States. The change of terminal issue did 
not affect the eight other employers as they \vere 
not now seeking such change. Thus, the strike was 
against two employers over an item \vhich did not 
affect the employers of the claimants herein. 
SUBPOINT D 
THE INDUSTRIAL COl\1MISSION ERRED IN APPLY-
ING THE LAW IN MAKING ITS CONCLUSION AND 
DECISION. 
The Appeals Referee in' his Con1n1ent~ CR 80, 
81), which vvas adopted by the Industrial Comnlis-
sion, statf's that under the mandate of the decision of 
this Court in Olof Nelson Construction Co. v. Industri-
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al Commission (. ___________ Utah ____________ , 243 Pac. 2d 
951)' 
"* * * it rnust be considered that the action 
taken by the union against two of the employer 
group was actually an action against the entire 
group. Therefore, the entire membership of 
the union group was involved in strike action 
against the entire membership of the employer 
group and the unemployment of the claimants 
came about as a result of a stoppage of work 
due to strike pressure brought to bear by the 
Union." 
This Court in the a hove case did not lay down 
a mandate that action taken against two of the group 
must be deemed to be action against the whole group, 
and the claimants here be denied benefits. 
In the Olof Nelson case, supra, the Associated 
General Contractors and the unions had bargained as 
a group for years and were then bound by a collective 
bargaining agreement, which was open for the dis-
cussion of wages only; the sole and only dispute be-
tween the unions and the AGG was over the wage 
increase; that the AGG gave a written notice to the 
Union that a strike against one would be considered 
a strike against all, and later made this policy known 
to the union several times; that a strike vote was 
taken and a strike called at the Barker and Paul jobs 
only, and no picket or strike was established any 
other job of these two employers; that the picketing 
commenced on the 2nd day of June and by the 5th 
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the Employers had all closed down their operations; 
there was no doubt that the objective of the union in 
striking the Paul and Baker jobs was to obtain wage 
increases for everyone covered by the contract in ef-
fect and that this was the sole and only issue involved; 
and that the union was successful in gaining a new 
wage scale under the contract. Mr. Chief Justice 
Wolfe wrote the majority decision, and stated that 
the issue was: 
" * * * This requires a determination of 
the fundamental issue in this case -- what 
caused the work stoppage and resulting un-
employment?" 
He quoted the disqualification provisions of Sec-
tion 35-4-5 (a) (b) (c) and (d), and then said: 
"Our conclusion is that the various dis-
qualification provisions of our Employment 
Security Act reveal that the underlying legisla-
tive intent is for the commission to determine 
the claimant's elgibility by adhering to the 
volitional test as announced in the Bodinson, 
Bunny's Waffle Shop and McKinley Cases in 
California." 
In Conclusion said: 
"Our cone lusion in this case is that the 
sounder view is to recognizf' these large scale 
bargaining units as the groups involved \Yithin 
the meaning of the Employment Security Act. 
Their nun1ber and scope are increasing. Both 
34 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
labor and management have seen fit to resort 
to such a device for a uniform, expedient means 
of negotiating their agreements. There is no 
dispute that the economic sanction of the A.F. 
of L. in this case was directed against the entire 
employer association. The strike was called 
for and on behalf of every employee covered 
by the agreement. It therefore directly in-
volved all these claimants, at each particular 
place of employment at which they were last 
employed. The strike was fomented by claim-
ants through their duly authorized union rep-
resentatives. They are members of the group 
which gained a raise in wages because of the 
strike and are parties to the scheme or plan to 
foment it. Therefore they are not entitled to 
unemployment benefits. The order of the 
Industrial Commission is reversed. Costs are 
awarded to the plaintiff." 
This decision requiring the application of the 
volitional tests of the Bodinson, Bunny's Waffle Shop 
and McKinley cases in California to cases coming 
under the Utah Employment Security Act, requires 
and compels the Industrial Commission to make its 
determination of disqualifications upon the merits 
of the labor problem rather than on statutory pro-
visions. Thus, the Industrial Commission finding 
must be who is the party guilty of causing the work 
stoppage which caused the unemployment, the 
guilty party caused the action and this volition allows 
or disallows the granting of benefits. This court 
applied the volitional test to the facts of that case, 
where the union and the AGG had a contract in 
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force, the union applied economic action in the form 
of a strike against all of the employers to obtain an 
increase in wages for all of the employees covered 
by the contract, the AGG having announced that 
unemployment would result if this happened, the 
claimant then, by the action of its union in striking 
for the benefit of the claimant, because unemployed 
of his own volition and was held ineligible for bene-
fits. 
The Appeals Referee and the Industrial Com-
mission say that the Olof Nelson Construction case, 
supra, requires the determination that the action of 
the union in striking the two employers must be 
considered as against the whole group, thus all of 
the employees are involved and ineligible. Such 
a position is a failure to apply the Olof Nelson Con-
struction division, supra, to the facts before this court. 
In the case at bar there was no contract be-
tween the union and the Intermountain Operators 
League; the sole reason for the strike against P .I.E. 
and Consolidated Freightways over their eleven state 
operation was because they insisted and demanded 
on the change in terminals in their eleven \Yestern 
State operation~ the strike was called for the benefit 
of the employees of P.I.E. and Consolidated Freight-
ways only as the other employers had abandoned 
the demand for tt:'nninal change; the employers 
locked out their ernployt:'es and put up a cargo em-
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bargo at the expiration of the contract; no negotia-
tions between the League and the union after the 
first week in May; individual bargaining and ac-
ceptance of the memorandum agreement reached 
in Los Angeles; strike against three employers after 
others settled; no announcement by the League that 
strike would cause unemployment, only made such 
statement when learned the strike had been called; 
the partial shut down of the employers after the 
strike against P.I.E. and Consolidated; pickets were 
established and the strike was against P .I.E. and 
Consolidated Freightways at all of their points of 
operations in the eleven Western States and not just 
in Utah and Idaho; the ceasing of operation by the 
employers was not due to the strike; and there was 
no bargaining between the unions and the Inter-
mountain Operators League after the 1st week in 
May, the bargaining and the settlement of the new 
contract was on an individual basis and only after 
strikes against three additional employers. 
Under the volitional tests established by the Olof 
Nelson Construction Co., case, supra, the claimants 
here are not unemployed by their own violation 
and disqualified for benefits. The Intermountain 
Operators League and the Union had no meetings 
from the 1st week in May until the date of the 
strike on the 19th of May. The issue over which the 
strike was called was peculiar to P.I.E. and Con-
solidated only and the other employers did not make 
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such demands in Los Angeles. The Employers 
locked out their employees when the contract was 
terminated, and again on or about the 19th of May, 
1955, which lockout was not caused by or had any-
thing to do with the strike against P .I.E. and Con-
solidated Freightways. We submit that the claim-
ants herein were not unemployed by their own voli-
tion under the decision of the Olof Nelson Construc-
tion Co., case, supra, and are entitled to benefits 
for the time they were unemployed because of the 
employer lockout of these claimants. 
The volitional tests of Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. Cal-
ifornia Employment Commission, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 109 
P. 2d 935; Bunny's "\Vaffle Shop v. California Em-
ployment Comm., 24 Cal. 2d 735, 151 Pac. 2d 22~; 
and McKinley v. California Employment S. Corn., 
34 Cal. 2d 238, Pac. 2d 602, which Chief Justice 'Yolfe 
announced in the Olof Nelson Construction decision, 
supra, depend on the California disqualification 
statute, "An indivdual is not eligible for benefits ... 
(a) if he left his work because of a trade dispute 
and for the period during which he continues out of 
work by reason of the fact that the trade dispute is 
still in active progress in the establishment in which 
he was employed." This California statute is sub-
stantially the same as the Utah disqualification 
statute in 1935, which was repudiated by the Legis-
lature in 1936. Obviously the Legislature felt that 
the volitional test which required the Industrial Com-
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mission tD inquire into the merits of a labor question 
was not suited to Utah, and changed to present dis-
qualification provision. 
In the Bodinson Case, supra, the California Court 
determined that an employee who refused to cross 
a picket line established by another union at his 
place of employment voluntarily left his employment 
due to a trade dispute, and was disqualified for bene-
fits. In the Bunny's Waffle Case, supra, the Califor-
nia Court, where the employers were seeking group 
bargaining but the Union resisted, and one restaurant 
reduced it wages 25 cents per hour and instigated a 6 
day week with split shifts, the employees left their 
jobs, the other restaurants closed down, held that the 
claimants left their work because of the action of the 
employer in reducing wages and conditions and not 
because of the trade dispute in existance with their 
employer. The Court determined that though the 
employees left their work of their own choice, that 
choice was not freely made but was dictated by the 
employers use of economic weapon of reduced wages 
and conditions. In the McKinley case, supra, where 
the union and employer had bargained for several 
years, the group announced a policy of strike against 
one as against all, in the past when one was struck 
they all closed, when the picket was established the 
union agent was informed that they all would close 
and he replied that he expected as much, the entire 
action was seeking a new uniform contract from 
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the group covering wages, and at no time was there 
any individual demand upon employers, the Cal-
ifornia Court held that the lockout was caused by 
the strike and the employees, when they knew that 
the strike would cause their unemployment, volun-
tarily left their employment under the disqualifica-
tion provisions of the California statute. 
We submit that the tests of these California 
cases are not applicable herein, that the claimants 
here were not unemployed because of their volitional 
action in leaving their employment, and these claim-
ants are entitled to receive compensation. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we wish to again point out that 
Section 35-4-5 (d) requires the Industrial Commis-
sion to find that the unemployment is due to a stop-
page of work exisiting because of a strike involving 
workers at the factory or establishment where claim-
ant is or was last employed, and not upon a finding of 
the merits of the labor trouble or that the claimant 
left his employment because of a trade dispute. 
The Intermountain Operators League locked out 
their employees at the expiration date of the con-
tract, had no further negotiations vvith the unions, 
and when notified of a strike against P. I. E. and Con-
solidated Freight\Yo}rs locked out their employees 
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again. There was no contract between the Unions 
and the League, the issue that caused the strike was 
limited solely to P. I. E. and Consolidated, the strike 
was against these two Companies in all of the eleven 
Western States, the employers locked out their em-
ployees and put out notices ceasing. business before 
May 1st and again about May 20th, there was no 
negotiations or dealings between the League and 
the unions between those dates, there was no an-
nounced policy that a strike would cause a shutdown 
prior to the strike, independent bargaining between 
the unions and employers, and strikes called against 
individual employers. Under these and other facts 
the disqualification for benefits of Section 35-4-5 do 
not apply, these claimants are entitled to compensa-
tion for time unemployed because of the lockout by 
their employers, and the decision of the Industrial 
Commission is in error and should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLARENCE M. BECK 
REID W. NIELSON 
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